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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20020679-CA 
vs. 
LACY BISSEGGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for illegal possession or use of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), in the Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, the 
Honorable James R. Taylor presiding. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly determine that defendant, who was merely a 
passenger, had no standing to contest the search of the vehicle or the opening of a 
small jar left inside the passenger compartment? 
1 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant provision(s) are included in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free 
zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999); possession of unprescribed Lortab in a drug-free zone, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1999); and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5(l) (1999). R. 7. 
Defendant was bound over on the methamphetamine and paraphernalia charges 
following a preliminary hearing at which Provo Police Officer Brian Wolken 
testified. R. 20, 113. 
Defendant later filed a motion to suppress. R. 25-38. The State filed a 
response, arguing that (a) defendant had no standing to challenge the search, and 
(b) the search of the vehicle and its contents, including the Carmex jar, was valid 
because the driver gave consent. R. 43-56. The trial court held a hearing on the 
matter. R. 60-61. No transcript of the hearing is included in the record. The 
minutes indicate that the prosecutor and defense counsel presented argument, but do 
not indicate that any testimony was taken. Id. 
The court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that defendant, as a 
passenger, did not have standing to contest the legality of the search. R. 65-68. 
The court further determined that when defendant exited the vehicle, leaving the 
container behind, she abandoned the container, if it was hers, and consequently had 
no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the container. R. 66. 
Defendant entered a conditional plea, admitting to possession of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony. R. 85-91. She reserved the right to 
contest the trial court's ruling denying her motion to suppress. R. 87. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On November 5, 2001, Provo Police Officer Brian Wolken stopped a car in 
which defendant was a passenger because the vehicle had an expired registration. 
R. 68. When the officer noted the smell of alcohol, he had the driver step out of 
!This statement of the facts is taken from the trial court's "Ruling on Motion to 
Suppress." See R. 65-68. Defendant recites the facts according to the "Agreed Statement 
of Facts re: Suppression Ruling" signed by both parties and allegedly the facts as found 
by the trial court in rendering its ruling on the motion to suppress. See R. 105-107; Br. 
Aplt., at *3 (Statement of Relevant Facts) (asterisks indicate page numbers the State has 
used when referring to the unpaginated Brief of Appellant, beginning with " * 1 " for the 
page that includes the "Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court"). The Agreed Statement, 
however, was filed several months after the court's ruling. The trial court did not rely on 
the Agreed Statement. Rather, the record suggests that the trial court rejected the Agreed 
Statement's version of the facts. The Agreed Statement's version corresponds exactly to 
the fact statement in defendant's proposed "Ruling on Motion to Suppress and Findings." 
See R. 69-76. The trial court expressly declined to adopt that fact statement, stating that it 
was "uncomfortable with the articulation of the findings and conclusions in [defendant's] 
submitted 'Ruling.'" R. 68 (Ruling on Motion to Suppress). 
Further, defendant has not challenged on appeal the trial court's findings nor its 
rejection of her version of the facts. Moreover, nothing suggests that the trial court has 
reviewed the Agreed Statement, let alone approved it as accurate, as required under rule 
11(f) and (g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, prior to its inclusion in the record on 
appeal. 
3 
the car for field sobriety tests. R. 67-68. The driver passed the tests, and the 
officer concluded that the driver was not driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. 
Because of the odor of alcohol, the officer wished to search the vehicle for open 
containers and asked the driver for permission to conduct a search. R. 68. 
Apparently believing that consent had been given,2 the officer asked defendant 
to exit the vehicle to permit the search. Id. As defendant got out, the officer saw a 
small, opaque lip balm ("Carmex") container on the dash. Id. He had not noticed 
the container when looking into the car at an earlier point in the incident. Id. 
During his search, the officer opened the Carmex container and discovered the 
methamphetamine which was the basis for charging defendant with possession of a 
controlled substance. Id. The officer found no open containers of alcohol in the 
vehicle. Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that Officer Wolken violated her Fourth Amendment rights 
when he opened the Carmex container on the dashboard without probable cause and 
without her consent. Br. Aplt., at *6 (Argument).3 The State concedes that Officer 
2Having concluded that defendant had no standing to contest the search of the 
vehicle or jar, the court declined to determine whether consent was given. R. 67. 
Further, the court did not address the scope of consent, if any. 
3In the first statement of her Argument, defendant claims that Officer Wolken's 
search violated rights granted her by the United States Constitution and the Utah State 
Constitution. Defendant, however, has suggested no reason for this Court to expand the 
scope of her relevant rights under the Utah Constitution beyond the scope of those rights 
(continued...) 
4 
Wolken did not have probable cause to search the vehicle or its contents. 
Defendant's argument nevertheless fails because she has demonstrated no 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the Carmex jar left in the vehicle.4 
3(...continued) 
under the United States Constitution. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that Utah 
courts should construe article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution in a manner similar to 
its federal counterpart unless compelling circumstances justify other treatment. State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1996). The Court has also given notice that 
appellate courts will not engage in a separate state constitutional analysis unless an 
argument for different state and federal constitutional analyses is briefed. State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1988). Defendant has not presented a separate state 
constitutional analysis of the issue here, and the State therefore does not address one. 
4Defendant also asserts in passing that she was illegally detained. Br. Aplt, at *6 
(Argument). Defendant has not adequately briefed this issue, and this Court need not 
address it. State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah App. 1998) ("[Defendant's brief 
contains no legal analysis or authority to support [her] argument. . . . It is well 
established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately 
briefed."). Defendant has not provided any authority suggesting that an officer who is 
conducting a search and who, to facilitate that search, asks a passenger to exit a vehicle, 
thereby unreasonably detains the passenger. Cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 
(1997) (police officer may, as a matter of course, order passenger of lawfully stopped 
vehicle to exit vehicle); State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (assuming 
passenger was seized where officers were justified in stopping car to investigate 
complaint against driver, seizure was reasonable). More importantly, the officer's 
discovery of the methamphetamine in the Carmex jar was the result of his search of the 
vehicle and jar, not the result of any detention of defendant. Thus, evidence found by 
opening the methamphetamine jar was not "fruit" resulting from defendant's detention. 
Cf Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (setting forth "fruit of the 
poisonous tree" doctrine). 
5 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE THAT 
SHE HAD AN EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE VEHICLE 
OR CARMEX JAR, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
CONCLUDED THAT SHE HAD NO STANDING TO CONTEST 
THE SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE OR OPENING OF THE JAR 
Warrantless searches are presumed unreasonable unless the State can justify 
the search under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Bisner, 
2001 UT 99, U 43, 37 P.3d 1073. Fourth Amendment rights, however, are personal 
in nature and may not be vicariously asserted. State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 
915 (Utah App. 1992). 
In other words, "the proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of 
establishing that [her] own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the 
challenged search or seizure." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132 n.l (1978). A 
defendant may not invoke the exclusionary rule, even where an unreasonable search 
has occurred, unless the defendant has a "legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
invaded place." Id. at 143. "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and 
seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of 
a third person's premises or property has not had any of [her] Fourth Amendment 
rights infringed." Id. at 134. 
"Furthermore, '[o]nce the defendant has been put on notice that the state 
claims the warrantless search was constitutional because [the defendant] has no 
expectation of privacy in the area searched, then the defendant must factually 
6 
demonstrate" that she does, in fact, have a legitimate expectation of privacy. 
Sepulveda, 842 P.2d at 915 (quoting State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah 
App. 1990)) (alterations in original). This expectation of privacy is sometimes 
called "standing."5 
A defendant claiming a legitimate expectation of privacy in an area (or 
standing to suppress evidence from an unreasonable search of that area) must meet 
a two-part test. State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah App. 1993). "First the 
defendant must prove that [she] had a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
searched area. Second, the defendant must prove that the expectation of privacy 
was reasonable in the view of society as a whole." Id. A defendant who asserts no 
property or possessory interest in an automobile or in property seized from the 
automobile cannot prove a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the 
property.6 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 129, 130 n.l, 148. 
In its response to defendant's motion to suppress, the State argued that 
defendant lacked standing to assert a Fourth Amendment claim. R. 54. The State 
thereby gave defendant notice that she had been put to her proof to show that she 
had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle and/or the Carmex jar. 
5For a discussion of the theoretical interplay between traditional principles of 
standing and substantive Fourth Amendment rights, see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 428-29. 
^'Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the 
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 
n.12. 
7 
Defendant, however, called no witnesses and presented no evidence that she 
had a property or possessory interest in either the vehicle or the Carmex jar. She 
attached no affidavits to her motion to suppress and apparently presented no 
evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress. R. 25-38, 60-61. See also Br. 
Aplt., at *2-3 (Statement of Relevant Facts) (conceding that "[n]o evidence was 
taken by the Court nor offered by the parties at the motion hearing"). 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Having received no evidence on 
the matter, the trial court made no finding that defendant had a possessory or 
property interest. Rather, the court found that defendant "did not have standing to 
assert any objections the driver may have had to the fact or scope of the search of 
his automobile" and that "she abandoned the container, if it was hers, by leaving it 
behind." R. 66 (emphasis added). 
Defendant suggests that the trial court "relied on the 'Stipulation of Facts' 
signed by the parties and the transcript of the preliminary hearing." Br. Aplt., at *3 
(Statement of Relevant Facts). The trial court, however, rejected the "Agreed 
Statement of Facts re: Suppression Ruling." See footnote 1, supra. Further, the 
record does not indicate that the trial court relied on the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing. 
In any case, even if the trial court did rely on the transcript of the preliminary 
hearing, the only evidence from that hearing suggesting the possibility that 
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Carmex jar is the 
8 
testimony of Officer Wolken. R. 113. Officer Wolken, the only witness, testified 
that he thought the jar belonged to defendant because he did not notice the jar on 
the dash until after he had asked defendant to step out. R. 113:13-14. This 
testimony, had it been offered at the hearing on the motion to suppress, would not 
have established defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the jar.7 This 
court has already held that "an officer's belief is irrelevant to the question of a 
defendant's expectation of privacy." State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 197 (Utah App. 
1987).8 Further, defendant cannot rely on the State's burden to prove possession as 
an element of the offense to satisfy her burden to prove a privacy interest in the 
object of the search.9 
7Defendant apparently did not even assert at the time of the search that the car or 
the Carmex jar washers. SeeR. 113:13-14. 
8In DeAlo, the defendant was stopped for speeding while driving a car that 
belonged to the passenger's brother. 748 P.2d at 195. During the stop, the defendant 
consented to a search of the vehicle for controlled substances. Id. The investigating 
officer discovered cocaine in a secret compartment behind the back seat. Id. The 
defendant filed a motion to suppress and, at the hearing, relied solely on testimony by the 
officer that he understood that defendant was using the car with the owner's permission. 
Id. at 196. This Court held that the defendant had not met his burden to prove a 
legitimate expectation of privacy, observing that a "defendant's standing to object should 
not depend on the state of the officer's belief as to the defendant's possessory interest in 
the vehicle to be searched." Id. at 197 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
9See State v. Kolster, 869 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah App. 1994) (rejecting automatic 
standing rule that would grant standing to any defendant charged with possession of the 
seized evidence at the time of the search); State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 1005, 1008 (Utah App. 
1993) ("Defendant's only real argument is that if the State claims, in order to prove he 
committed a theft, that the money was in defendant's possession, then defendant must 
necessarily have a privacy interest sufficient to establish standing—or at least the State 
(continued...) 
9 
Defendant did not meet her burden to prove a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle or the jar. She did not establish that her own Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated by the search of the vehicle or the Carmex jar. 
Even assuming an unreasonable search had occurred, she was not entitled to invoke 
the exclusionary rule. The trial court properly denied the motion to suppress.10 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. Alternatively, if this Court 
concludes that defendant met her burden to prove that she had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the vehicle and Carmex jar, this Court should remand to 
the trial court for a determination of whether Officer Wolken had consent to search 
9(...continued) 
should not be heard to argue otherwise. We disagree with defendant's assertion. Such an 
argument is not sufficient to meet defendant's burden; defendant bears the burden of 
proving his standing. Such proof is not made by pointing to an allegation made by the 
State . . . ."). 
10Defendant is not entitled to a remand for further proceedings on whether she had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the Carmex jar. The "proponent of a 
motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that [her] own Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 424 n.l. Where a prosecutor argues that the 
proponent "lacks standing to challenge [a] search," the proponent is "put to [her] proof on 
any issue as to which [she] has the burden," including a demonstration of her property or 
possessory interest in the place or item searched. Id. at 424 n.l & 430 n.12. If the 
proponent fails to meet her burden, a reviewing court must assume that she had no 
property or possessory interest. Id. at 424 n.l. Remand is not appropriate. Id. 
10 
the vehicle, whether the Carmex jar was within the scope of the consent, and 
whether the driver's consent should be effective against the defendant. 
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Addendum 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, 
a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute 
a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any 
provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 
37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons 
with respect to whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of 
management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and 
upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be 
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a 
firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his 
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not 
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not 
to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony 
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which may be 
for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for 
probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, 
boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but 
less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of 
property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other 
place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2) 
(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person, 
that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not 
included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and 
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license number 
which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a 
controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, 
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to 
obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or 
obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, 
forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or 
the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to utter the 
same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, 
imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another 
or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who 
commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug 
Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon 
conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of 
those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the 
time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking 
lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through 
(viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act 
occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be 
imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been 
established but for this subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a first 
degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one 
degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the 
individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true 
age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described 
in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as described in 
Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil 
or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction or 
acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this 
state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or 
persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or 
substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so with knowledge 
of the character of the substance or substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his professional 
practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances 
or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or 
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a 
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or 
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid 
provision or application. 
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